Passwordless authentication

Passwordless authentication is a project: we implement a suitable method(s) — passkeys/WebAuthn (tied to a device/biometrics, the most robust and phishing-resistant), magic email links, one-time codes (email/SMS), set up the login process, registration, recovery and a fallback. Honestly about the nature, this is key: passwordless login removes the classic password risks (guessing, reuse, password-database leaks, password phishing) — a real plus; but it is NOT 'magically secure': it SHIFTS the point of trust — a magic link/code by email is only as reliable as the user's email is protected (hack the email — hack the login); a passkey is very robust but tied to a device and requires well-thought recovery on loss/device change. Honestly about support: passkeys are supported by modern devices/browsers, but not equally everywhere — a fallback method is needed for compatibility. Honestly about recovery, important: without a password the access-recovery process becomes a critical link — too weak negates security, too strict locks people out; we work it out carefully. Honestly about the boundary: this is a login method, not all of account security (sessions, bot protection — adjacent). Honestly about access: access to the code/authentication system is needed. Honestly about the effect: more convenient and resistant to password attacks, but we do NOT guarantee sales growth by itself. An important boundary: this is passwordless, not a 2FA add-on to a password (746 — separate/adjacent) and not OAuth login (748). Picture this: instead of 'forgot the password / the password leaked' — login by passkey or magic link, without a password as the weak link. The base price starts from 20,000 ₽ per project; it depends on the method and system.

• Users forget passwords, lose access, go to recovery.
• Passwords are guessed, reused, stolen from leaks.
• Password phishing and weak passwords are a constant risk.
• Login is inconvenient, reducing registration/return.

• Implementing the method(s): passkeys/WebAuthn, magic links, OTP
• Login process, registration and a fallback for compatibility
• A well-thought access-recovery process
• Server-side verification and secure storage of identifiers
• A balance of security and convenience
• Indicating limits (trust in email/device)
• Testing login/recovery scenarios
• Handover and review with you

• Login without a password as the weak link
• Resistance to guessing/leaks/phishing of passwords
• More convenient login (passkey/magic link)
• A fallback and recovery (no absolute)

• We clarify the audience, devices, method; collect access
• We implement passwordless login, a fallback and recovery
• We test compatibility and scenarios, review with you

• Is passwordless login fully secure?

  It removes password risks (guessing, leaks, reuse), but does not 'cancel security': it shifts the point of trust. A magic link/code is only as reliable as the email is protected; a passkey is very robust but tied to a device and requires well-thought recovery. It is a plus, not an absolute.

• Do passkeys work everywhere?

  They are supported by modern devices/browsers, but not equally everywhere. So we make a fallback method (e.g. a magic link/code) for compatibility, so no one is left without login.

• What about recovery without a password?

  It is a critical link: weak recovery negates security, strict recovery locks people out. We work out the process carefully (fallback methods, identity verification), balancing security and availability.