Quantum-safe encryption preparation (long-term)

Post-quantum cryptography (quantum-safe) is encryption algorithms resistant to being broken by future powerful quantum computers, which could theoretically break part of modern cryptography (RSA, ECC). Preparation is an audit of your data and systems (where and what encryption, which data is critical and long-lived), a risk assessment and a transition plan to post-quantum algorithms (as they are standardized). Honestly about 'real but long-term — without panic', this is key: the topic is genuine, not a marketers' invention. But it is also early to panic: today quantum computers are NOT capable of breaking current strong encryption, and the exact timelines for when they will (and whether they will in a practical form) are unknown — years, possibly many years. So this is about planning, not 'urgently change everything today'. We honestly give a balanced picture, without alarmism. Honestly about the real 'harvest now, decrypt later' risk, this is the essence: the main current threat is not that you will be hacked today, but that encrypted data can be intercepted and stored NOW to be decrypted LATER, when quantum capabilities appear. This matters only for data that must remain secret for a very long time (10-20+ years): state secrets, long-term medical/legal/financial secrets. For data with a short value period the risk is irrelevant. We honestly tie the necessity to your data's secrecy lifespan. Honestly about 'standards are early': post-quantum algorithms are being standardized (NIST selected the first), but this is the start of the road — tools, libraries, best practices are still forming, changes are possible. An early transition carries the risk that something will change. We honestly account for the immaturity. Honestly about 'premature for most': the vast majority of businesses and sites do not need post-quantum cryptography now — it is excessive. It is justified for organizations with genuinely long-lived secrets and high security requirements. For the rest, tracking the topic is enough. We will honestly assess whether it is your case. Honestly about the effect: we give a quantum-risk assessment for YOUR data, tied to its secrecy lifespan, and a realistic plan (more often — 'track, prepare an inventory, do not rush the replacement'), without panic and without ignoring. Honestly about access: relevant with long-lived critical secrets. An important boundary: this is post-quantum preparation; ordinary cryptography/security — adjacent; BCI (also long-term) — 1135. The base price starts from 110,000 ₽ (depends on the audit and systems scale).

• There is data that must remain secret for 10+ years (the 'decrypt later' risk).
• High security requirements / regulation requiring looking to the future.
• Panic around the 'quantum threat' or, conversely, complete ignoring.
• It is unclear whether you need post-quantum encryption already now.

• An audit of data and systems: where and what encryption, which data is critical and long-lived
• A quantum-risk assessment tied to your data's secrecy lifespan
• An analysis of the 'harvest now, decrypt later' threat for long-lived secrets
• A transition plan to post-quantum algorithms (as NIST standardizes)
• An honest urgency recommendation (more often — 'track and inventory, do not rush')
• Honest boundaries (real but long-term — without panic; quantum computers do not yet break encryption; standards are early; premature for most; it is a plan, not an urgent replacement)
• Documentation and handover
• Review with you

• A quantum-risk assessment for your specific data and systems
• Tying the necessity to the secrecy lifespan (relevant for the long-lived)
• A realistic plan without panic and without ignoring
• Honest boundaries (premature for most; standards are early; it is preparation, not an urgent replacement)

• We audit data/systems and determine the secrecy lifespan of critical data
• We assess the quantum risk (including harvest-now-decrypt-later) and standardization
• We give a plan and an honest urgency recommendation, set boundaries and hand over to you

• Quantum computers already break encryption — do I need to urgently change everything?

  No, without panic, honestly: today quantum computers are NOT capable of breaking current strong encryption, and the exact timelines for when they will (and whether practically) are unknown — years, possibly many years. This is about planning, not 'urgently change everything today'. But the topic should not be ignored either, because of the 'harvest now, decrypt later' risk. We give a balanced picture without alarmism and without carelessness.

• Does my site/business need post-quantum encryption now?

  Most likely no, honestly: for the vast majority of businesses and sites it is excessive now. It is justified for those with data that must remain secret for a very long time (10-20+ years) — state secrets, long-term medical/legal/financial secrets. For data with a short value period the quantum risk is irrelevant. We will honestly tie the necessity to your data's secrecy lifespan rather than scare everyone with the 'quantum threat'.

• If transitioning, can it be done once and for all now?

  With a caveat, honestly: post-quantum algorithms are being standardized (NIST selected the first), but this is the start of the road — tools, libraries and practices are still forming, changes are possible. Too early a transition carries the risk that something will change and require redoing. So for most it is more sensible now to inventory and plan, and do the full replacement as standards mature. We honestly build this immaturity into the plan.